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Acting in the interest of their residents, within limits imposed by Federal statute 
and by the Constitution, states have incentives to impose taxes on the profits of 
corporations owned by nonresidents. This paper presents a model within which a state, 
using an apportionment formula that includes a sales factor, would choose to tax the 
income of out-of-state corporations that derive revenues from the sale or licensing of 
intangible assets to in-state customers, provided that such corporations have sufficient 
nexus to be taxable.  Although such policies enable states to capture rents from 
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Recent years have seen considerable debate about the proper role and scope of state corporation
income taxes. Under what conditions can or should a state be able to impose taxes on the income of
a corporation? Of the universe of all corporations in the world, which are or should be taxable by an
individual state? The “is” part of these questions depends on current laws and their interpretation.
The “ought” part of these questions can be addressed from a legal/constitutional perspective or,
alternatively, from the perspective of economic analysis.
In the US federation, the taxing powers of state governments are legally restrained ﬁrst, by the
US Constitution, and second, by Federal statutes. The Constitution’s Commerce and Due Process
Clauses, in particular, have played a major role in deﬁning the taxing powers of the states. The
Commerce Clause states that Congress has the authority to regulate interstate commerce, which has
been interpreted to mean that state governments cannot impose policies, such as tariﬀs on interstate
trade, that interfere with interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause has been interpreted to mean
that Such taxes as states do impose cannot “unduly burden interstate commerce” (Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota ). In addition, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of a state to tax individuals or businesses without “due process of law”, which has been
interpreted to mean (again, see Quill) that there must be ”some deﬁnite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”. Under both
the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause, a business must have a suﬃcient nexus with a
state before it can be subject to tax there.1
As indicated by the remarks above, the precise meaning of any constitutional restraints on state
taxing powers is determined by the courts, which, in the absence of deﬁnitive rulings, can create
considerable uncertainty for taxing authorities and for taxpayers alike, and new rulings can trigger
signiﬁcant policy responses. For instance, in 1959, the Supreme Court ruled (Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. vs. Minnesota) that a state could constitutionally tax a portion of the proﬁts
of an out-of-state corporation that solicited sales there, even if it had no plant, employees, or other
physical presence or activities within the state. Apparently, this ruling came as a surprise to many,
since it spurred nearly immediate Congressional action, in the form of a Federal statute, Public
Law (PL)86-272, that speciﬁcally prohibits states from imposing corporation income taxes on out-
of-state businesses if their only contact with a state is that they solicit sales for tangible products
there. Congress thus exercised its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce and, in
eﬀect, prohibited by statute state taxes of the type that the Supreme Court had just declared
constitutional. This law, which illustrates the potentially important role of Congress in regulating
the taxing powers of states, signiﬁcantly restrains the ability of states to impose taxes on the proﬁts
of out-of-state corporations.
1For one recent discussion of the Commerce Clause, including the so-called “Dormant” Commerce Clause, see
Enrich (2007), who writes (p. 23): “Over the centuries, the Supreme Court has deployed this dormant Commerce
Clause hundreds of times to strike down a wide variety of state tax and regulatory measures that were found to
impermissibly interfere with the free ﬂow of economic activity in a national common market.” For extensive discussion
of these matters, including a record of opinions from relevant case law, see Pomp and Oldman (2005).
1Whether by accident or design, PL86-272 leaves open an issue that has come to assume considerable
importance. Suppose that a corporation is not physically present in a state, but that it derives
revenues from the sale or licensing of intangible services or assets there. These intangible services
or assets might, for example, take the form of downloadable software, music, or text, delivered
electronically to in-state households or businesses. Alternatively, they might take the form of
license fees or royalties paid for the use of trademarks, patents, or copyrighted materials. If a
business delivers tangible products to in-state consumers, for instance through mail-order deliveries
of books, CDs, or other physical items, its income is not subject to that state’s corporation income
tax because of PL86-272. However, because the law is silent with respect to intangible goods and
services, the power of a state to tax the proﬁts of ﬁrms that derive revenues from the sale of
intangibles is not directly settled by PL86-272.2
In recent years, a number of court cases have addressed the question of whether a state may or
may not tax the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms that have no physical presence within the state. In
one noteworthy case, Geoﬀrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission (1993), the Supreme Court
of South Carolina ruled that states may indeed impose such taxes. (In this case, a ﬁrm outside
of South Carolina licensed the trademarks used by retail stores within South Carolina, and the
ﬁrm was deemed to be subject to South Carolina’s corporation income tax.) This issue has been
the subject of ongoing litigation and policy reform.3 Many states now impose state corporation
income taxes on out-of-state ﬁrms that derive revenues from the sale of intangibles to in-state
buyers, for instance by declaring that any ﬁrm that “does business” or that “derives income from
sources within the state” is taxable there.4 Of course, this “doing business” nexus standard does
not yield any taxable income for a state unless it apportions the revenues of multistate corporations
in a way that includes the sales of a corporation within the state, and thus the issue of nexus is
closely linked to that of income apportionment. The classical “three-factor” formula does so by
apportioning the income of a multi-state corporation on the basis of a ﬁrm’s payroll, capital, and
2For convenience, the term “sale” of intangibles will generally be used henceforth as a shorthand for any means by
which the owner of an intangible can derive compensation for the right to own or use it, whether by outright transfer
of ownership, or through licensing, royalties, or by other means.
3As one illustration of the current level of activity in this area, see Boucher and Ponda (2008), who cite court
rulings, administrative rulings, and statutory changes related to nexus issues in ﬁfteen diﬀerent states for the year
2007.
4It appears that many practitioners interpret “income” and its “sources” to be closely connected to a ﬁrm’s revenues
but not to its costs. Of course, proﬁts are the diﬀerence between revenues and costs and thus are determined by
both. For instance, when a corporation buys an input from a vendor in state A rather than state B, it does so
because this raises its proﬁts, just as is true when it sells a unit of its output to a purchaser in one state rather than
another. In both cases, transactions with a counterparty in another state result in increased proﬁts, and thus, as
a matter of economic principles, it could be said that both types of transactions are “sources” of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Similarly, it is sometimes said that a business that derives revenue from transactions with parties in a given state
have a “deﬁnite link” or “minimum connection” to that state because the state’s courts could be called upon to help
enforce the contracts underlying these transactions, but the same can certainly be said of enforcement of contracts
involving purchases from vendors within the state. In short, from an economic perspective, there is little or no basis
to distinguish between sales and purchases in determining whether a business is “doing business” within the state
or has an “economic presence”. To the author’s knowledge, no state asserts its power to tax the incomes of out-of-
state businesses that purchase goods or services from vendors within its boundaries. One might guess that states
distinguish between purchases and sales in this respect mainly as a matter of export promotion. Similar remarks
would apply to the determination of the component factors used for purposes of formula apportionment.
2sales within a state, with each of these three factors being equally weighted. Few states now adhere
to this formula, however, as they increasingly apply a greater weight to the “sales factor” in their
apportionment formulae. As noted by Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), as of 1979, the sales factor
was overweighted in the apportionment formulae of only 5 states, but this number had grown to
more than 20 states by 1995. Currently, only 9 states apply a 33% weight to the sales factor, while
most others apply weights between 50% and 100%. Of these, 22 presently use a 50% weight. Five
states now apply a 100% weight to the sales factor for many or all types of businesses, and several
others will transition to a single-factor sales-based apportionment formula within the next several
years.5 Thus, as a broad characterization, it is fair to say that corporations must pay income taxes
in all states where they sell their goods and services, except that they may be exempt from income
taxes in states where they export tangible goods, due to PL86-272. The sales factor has come to
predominate in the apportionment of the proﬁts of multistate corporations.
These developments raise a number of interesting economic questions. To return to the opening
paragraph, one might ask whether, as a matter of economic policy, state governments “should” be
empowered to tax the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms, even if they have no physical presence within a
state.6 To address this question, it is necessary to analyze the economic implications of diﬀerent
nexus standards for state corporation income taxes. The following analysis examines the eﬀects
of state corporation income taxes in a series of models that specify the taxing powers of states,
and their economic relationship to out-of-state households and businesses, in diﬀerent ways. It also
examines how states would optimally set their corporation income tax policies, assuming that they
seek to advance the economic interests of their residents. This involves determining not only what
tax rates a state would choose, but whether or not it would wish to include a sales factor in an
income-apportionment formula. To anticipate the results, the analysis indicates that states have
conﬂicting incentives to tax the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms. On the one hand, such taxes may
beneﬁt the residents of a state by capturing rents that would otherwise accrue to the owners of
out-of-state ﬁrms. On the other hand, they can harm the residents of a state by imposing what
amounts to an implicit tariﬀ on imports, a policy that is not in itself advantageous to the households
residing within a small, open economy. The optimal state tax policy involves a balancing of these
two considerations, resulting, in equilibrium, in a non-zero tax on the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms.
In this equilibrium, interstate trade is distorted, and state corporation income taxes thus give rise to
5For analyses of the eﬀects of diﬀerent apportionment formulae, see, e.g. McLure (1980), Gordon and Wilson
(1986), Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), and references therein. The present analysis is limited to issues relating to state
taxation of business income, but analogous issues certainly arise in the international context. See, e.g, Shackelford and
Slemrod (1998) for an analysis of the revenue eﬀects of formula apportionment applied to US multinational ﬁrms.
It should also be noted that diﬀerent countries deal with the taxation of business proﬁts for multi-jurisdictional
enterprises in diﬀerent ways. See, e.g., Wildasin (1998, 2000), for some comparison of Canadian and US practices.
6It is important to distinguish the question of nexus for corporation income tax purposes, which is the topic of the
present analysis, from that of nexus for sales taxation. According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill, out-of-
state vendors are not subject to state sales taxation. To the degree that the sales tax is viewed as a consumption tax
on households, this decision creates substantial administrative obstacles for state policy, only imperfectly oﬀset by
the widespread but ineﬀectual imposition of use taxes. (As noted by Ring (1999), however, state sales taxes fall far
short of comprehensive consumption taxes in any case.) For a discussion of recent initiatives for “streamlined” sales
taxation, see Hellerstein and McLure (2004). These authors also discuss, and criticize, proposed Federal statutes
that would extend PL86-272 so that nexus, for state income tax purposes, would eﬀectively be based on a physical
presence standard.
3deadweight eﬃciency losses. This result alone does not determine whether state income taxation of
the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms is economically desirable, even within the framework of the models
developed below, since distributional equity considerations must also be taken into account. The
balancing of equity-eﬃciency tradeoﬀs and other policy considerations are discussed further in the
concluding section.
2 A Model and Variations
To see how the eﬀects of corporation income taxes depend on business organization, ownership,
and trade, it is convenient to begin with a very simple model and then to vary and extend this
model in steps, maintaining a consistent analytical approach and notation. The strategy is to
determine what state corporation income tax policy would be chosen by an individual state whose
policymakers seek to advance the economic interests of resident households. At each step of the
analysis, it is necessary to specify the institutional and economic framework within which policies
are chosen, and then to see how diﬀerent policy choices aﬀect the welfare of state residents.
In order to sharpen the focus on the economic interests of the residents of a state taken as a whole,
it is assumed throughout that each state contains many identical households who can be aggregated
into a single representative household, making it possible to ignore possible political conﬂicts among
heterogeneous state residents. It is also generally assumed that the state being analyzed is small
relative to the rest of the economy, so that its policies do not aﬀect equilibrium prices or tax policies
elsewhere. Finally, it is assumed throughout the analysis that each state provides public goods and
services that may or may not beneﬁt both residents and in-state ﬁrms. In order to focus attention
on tax policy, the levels of provision of any such public services are taken as exogenously ﬁxed.
It is therefore unnecessary to specify precisely how they aﬀect household utility or private sector
production. Not only is the model is extremely general in these respects, it will also be apparent that
none of the results depend on whether ﬁrms beneﬁt in any way from state government expenditures.
At each step, once it becomes clear how individual states choose the policies that best serve their
residents, it is possible to describe the equilibrium of an entire system of such states. As will be
seen, the equilibrium policies of the states result in an eﬃcient outcome for the system as a whole
in some cases but not in other cases. Comparing diﬀerent cases thus helps to shed light on how
diﬀerent institutional arrangements may or may not facilitate eﬃcient decentralized policymaking,
and why.
2.1 Case 1: Pure proﬁt taxation and foreign ownership.
Suppose that there are two sectors or industries, F and G, in a given state. Each sector consists of
many identical competitive ﬁrms operating under conditions of strictly decreasing returns to scale,
4so that they earn pure proﬁts.7 These proﬁts are subject to corporation income taxation at the
rate τ. As in a standard Arrow-Debreu economy, the proﬁts of these ﬁrms accrue to households
in accordance with exogenously-given initial ownership shares. For present purposes, the only
analytically important distinction between the F and G sectors is that ﬁrms in the former may
be owned, in part, by nonresidents, whereas the latter are assumed to be 100% owned by in-state
residents. This distinction is useful because it highlights the importance of nonresident ownership
in determining a state’s optimal tax policy. Let θ ∈ [0,1] denote the ownership share of nonresidents
in F-sector ﬁrms.
Since the ﬁrms in each sector are identical, the notation can be simpliﬁed by focusing on a single
representative ﬁrm in each sector. The production technology in the F sector is represented by a
strictly increasing, strictly concave, and smooth function φf(lf) of the amount of primary inputs,
represented by a vector lf. This input vector may be interpreted as labor (possibly of many types),
land, natural resources, or any other factors of production. Similarly, the production technology
in the G sector is represented by a well-behaved production function φg(lg). At this stage of the
analysis, the variable inputs are all non-traded factors of production, ﬁxed in supply for the state
as whole in the form of an endowment ¯ l, owned entirely by residents within the state, so that
lf + lg = ¯ l. (1)
The competitively determined factor price vector for primary inputs is denoted by w. The prices
of the outputs of both sectors are normalized at unity.8 The gross (before-tax) proﬁts of ﬁrms in
each sector are thus given by
πi = φi(li) − wli i = f,g (2)
Firms choose their inputs to maximize proﬁts net of tax, for which the ﬁrst-order conditions are
φil(li) − w = 0 i = f,g. (3)
Equations (1) and (3) determine the equilibrium values of (w,lf,lg) independently of the tax rate τ.
As expected, state taxation of pure proﬁts has no eﬀect on input or output choices, nor does it aﬀect
factor prices. Clearly, the burden of a state corporation income tax falls on these nonresidents, in
proportion to their ownership of ﬁrms within the F sector.
As noted above, the state government is assumed to provide some exogenously-ﬁxed bundle of
public goods and services, the cost of which is denoted by G. Assuming that the state may impose
a lump-sum tax of T on state residents in addition to taxes on business proﬁts, the state government
budget constraint is
T + τ(πf + πg) = G. (4)
7This means, of course, that business proﬁts in this analysis are “ﬁrm speciﬁc” and not “location speciﬁc”.
Location-speciﬁc rents can and do arise in the model, and are represented by the returns to locationally-ﬁxed resource
such as labor or natural resources, as described below.
8One possible interpretation is that both outputs are perfectly substitutable in consumption, units are chosen so
that their relative price is one, and either is then taken as num´ eraire. As a second interpretation, the outputs of
both sectors are traded on external markets at prices that are taken as parametrically given from the perspective of
a small state. In this case, the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in these sectors are assumed not to be subject taxation in other
states.
5Finally, given that public goods levels are ﬁxed, it is clear that the utility of the representative
state resident depends only on private good consumption. This, in turn, is equal to the household’s
income net of tax, which is determined by its income from ownership of primary inputs plus its
share of after-tax business proﬁts, i.e.,
Y = w¯ l + (1 − τ)([(1 − θ]πf + πg) − T + ¯ Y = w¯ l + πf + πg − θ(1 − τ)πf − G + ¯ Y . (5)
where ¯ Y represents any other exogenously-ﬁxed sources of income that may be received by the
state’s residents and the second equality follows by substitution from (4).9
Assuming that state policymakers choose the rate of taxation τ in the interest of the state’s repre-
sentative household, they seek to maximize Y . Given the fact that factor prices, allocations, and
gross proﬁts are unaﬀected by the rate of tax, it follows that
dY
dτ
= θπf ≥ 0 (6)
and the inequality is strict, provided that θ > 0. Hence:
Proposition 1: Provided that nonresidents own a positive share of proﬁt-making ﬁrms within the
state, the optimal state corporation income tax rate is 100%.
This straightforward result highlights the importance of foreign ownership of the ﬁrms in a state.
A pure proﬁts tax captures rents that would otherwise accrue to the owners of proﬁt-making ﬁrms.
If some of these owners do not reside within the state, the imposition of a tax on proﬁts allows the
state to transfer some of these rents from nonresidents to residents. Within the strict conﬁnes of the
model as developed so far, such rent transfers do not give rise to any allocative consequences: the
imposition of state corporation income taxes aﬀect the distribution of income among households
in the economy but do not give rise to any deadweight losses from ineﬃcient resource allocation.
Even if every state were to impose such taxes, and thus eﬀectively conﬁscate some portion of the
income that would otherwise accrue to residents of other states, these taxes would not result in an
ineﬃcient outcome for the economy as a whole.
Of course, in practice, there are many reasons why state corporation income taxes might produce
signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies. These could arise from the fact that corporation income taxes fall not only
on pure proﬁts but on other types of income (such as the normal return to capital). The deadweight
losses resulting from such taxes have been amply discussed elsewhere and need not be examined
further here.10 In addition, it should perhaps be emphasized that policies that transfer rents give
rise to incentives for rent-losers to lobby against them. In the present instance, although businesses
cannot inﬂuence the political process directly through voting, they might have incentives to expend
resources to limit the extent of rent transfers through state tax policies. These activities can also
9In particular, ¯ Y may include any net income that the households in this state derive from their share of ownership
of ﬁrms located in other states. Given that each state is assumed to be small, any such income may be treated as
exogenously ﬁxed from the viewpoint of any one state.
10See Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Wildasin (2006) for introductions to the literature on ﬁscal
competition, containing many references to other studies.
6be socially costly. The following analysis abstracts from such considerations, which however may
well warrant separate study.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is worth wondering whether and under what circumstances a state is or
should be constitutionally permitted to impose taxes directly on the nonwage income of nonresident
households. From an economic standpoint, in the model presented above, the incentive for a state
to impose a tax on corporations derives precisely from the fact it allows for a portion of the state’s
tax burden to be shifted to nonresident owners, and in fact is equivalent in its economic eﬀects
to a direct tax on the share of business net income received by nonresidents. Presumably such a
tax would be deemed an unconstitutional extension of state taxing powers, although this may be
debatable.
2.2 Case 2: Pure proﬁt taxation with foreign ownership and traded inputs
In the preceding case, issues relating to the apportionment of corporation income do not arise.
This is because ﬁrms are assumed to operate only within the boundaries of a single state, with
the possible exception that they may derive revenues from out-of-state sales which, by assumption,
could not make them subject to tax elsewhere. Now consider the case where interstate transactions
do occur. In particular, suppose that ﬁrms in the F sector, in addition to using non-traded primary
inputs lf in the production process, also use a vector of tradeable intermediate inputs m that they
import from out-of-state ﬁrms. Let p denote the price at which this input is purchased by ﬁrms
in the F sector. The production function for this sector is now written as φf(lf,m) and proﬁts in
this sector are given by
πf = φf(lf,m) − wlf − pm. (7)
Let M denote the total output of the out-of-state producers of the intermediate inputs, so that
M − m represents intermediate inputs sold to ﬁrms in other states, at a price denoted by ¯ p. The
proﬁts of the out-of-state producers of intermediate inputs are given by
πm = pm + ¯ p(M − m) − c(M) (8)
where c(M) is the cost function for these producers.
Case 2a: No nexus for intermediate goods producers
To begin, let us suppose that the out-of-state producers of intermediate goods are not subject to
taxation in states to which they export, for instance because these states do not include a sales
factor in their apportionment formulas, because courts declare such taxation to be unconstitutional,
or because Federal statutes, such as PL86-272, prohibit such taxation.
Since the export of the intermediate good has no tax consequences for its producers, these ﬁrms will
only export the intermediate good to states in which their products can be sold at a price as high
as that obtainable elsewhere. Hence, it must be the case in equilibrium that p = ¯ p, provided that
70 < m < M.11 The net income of the representative household in an importing state is still given
by (5), with the understanding that πf is given by (7) and where p = ¯ p is treated as parametrically
ﬁxed on external markets. In this case, the analysis of the optimal choice of the state’s corporation
income tax rate τ is essentially unchanged, and we have
Proposition 2a: Assuming that a state cannot or does not tax the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms,
Proposition 1 continues to hold. That is, provided that nonresidents own a positive share of proﬁt-
making ﬁrms within the state, the optimal state corporation income tax rate is 100%.
Case 2b: Single-factor sales-based apportionment
Now consider what happens when a state can and does impose a tax on the proﬁts of the out-of-
state producers of intermediate inputs. This can happen if some of the proﬁts of those ﬁrms are
apportioned to the states to which they export. To simplify the algebra and to obtain the most
clear-cut results, assume that states use only the sales factor to apportion the proﬁts of ﬁrms in
other states. In order to simplify the algebra still further, assume in addition that the cost of
production of intermediate inputs is zero, i.e., c(M) ≡ 0, so that the proﬁts of intermediate good
producers are equal to their total revenues.12 Under single-factor apportionment based on sales,
the importing state can impose its corporation income tax on the share
σ =
pm
pm + ¯ p(M − m)
(9)
of the proﬁts of the intermediate goods producing ﬁrms, whose after-tax proﬁts are now given by
π∗
m = (1 − στ − [1 − σ]¯ τ)πm
= (1 − στ − [1 − σ]¯ τ)(pm + ¯ p[M − m])
= (1 − τ)pm + (1 − ¯ τ)¯ p(M − m) (10)
where ¯ τ denotes the corporation income tax rate imposed in other states. The intermediate goods
producers choose m to maximize their proﬁts, the ﬁrst-order condition for which is
(1 − τ)p = (1 − ¯ τ)¯ p. (11)




(1 − ¯ τ)¯ p




This result illustrates the fact (see, e.g., McLure (1980)) that a corporation income tax is, implicitly,
a tax on those items that are used to apportion proﬁts. In the present case, proﬁts are apportioned
11If m = 0, the model eﬀectively reduces to the previous case. If m is an essential input for downstream producers,
however, 0 < m < M is guaranteed to hold in equilibrium.
12Under this simplifying assumption, the intermediate good may be thought of as a ﬁxed endowment, for instance
of some natural resource. The relationship between the domestic price of the intermediate good and the state’s tax
rate takes an especially simple form under this assumption, as shown in (11) below, but the main results to follow,
which hinge on the fact that the state’s tax raises the intermediate good price to domestic buyers, do not strictly
depend on this assumption.
8on the basis of sales alone, and the corporation income tax is thus, in part, a tax on the importation
of traded intermediate inputs. A small state cannot depress the net price received by ﬁrms that
export to it. An increase in the state’s corporation income tax rate must therefore give rise to a
compensatory increase in the price of imports, as shown in (12)
As before, the welfare of a state’s representative household is determined by its net of tax income,
which is now
Y = w¯ l+πf +πg −θ(1−τ)πf +τσπ∗
m + ¯ Y −G = w¯ l+πf +πg −θ(1−τ)πf +τpm+ ¯ Y −G. (13)
To calculate the eﬀect of state tax policy on net income, it is now necessary to take into account
the fact that p depends on τ. As a result, the level of imports, the amount of employment and
output in each sector of the state’s economy, the proﬁts of ﬁrms in both sectors, and the prices of
primary inputs may all be aﬀected by the choice of τ. Using the envelope theorem,
dY
dτ






















where the second equality follows by using (1) and (12) and where m ≡ dlnm/dlnp < 0 is the
general equilibrium elasticity of m with respect to p. The state’s optimal policy is to choose τ to









The ﬁrst term in (14), which is positive so long as an increase in τ reduces net proﬁts, represents
the burden imposed on nonresident owners of F-sector ﬁrms resulting from an increase in τ. The
second term, which is negative if τ > 0, represents the welfare loss from the distortion of trade in
intermediate inputs. From (15) it is clear that the optimal state policy is to set τ = 0 if θ = 0,
so as to avoid the distortion from the implicit tariﬀ that the corporation income tax imposes on
imports. This result conﬁrms, for this particular context, the classical ﬁnding that free trade is
optimal for a small open economy. More generally, however, if nonresidents own a share of ﬁrms in
the F sector, then it is optimal for the state to impose at least a modest corporation income tax
in order to capture some of the proﬁts in that sector that would otherwise ﬂow to nonresidents.
Thus:
Proposition 2b: If a state uses a single-factor sales-based apportionment formula, it is optimal
for the state to impose a corporation income tax at a non-zero rate, provided that nonresidents
have a positive ownership share of proﬁt-making ﬁrms within the state. An optimal corporation
income tax rate balances the marginal gain from the capture of rents from nonresidents against the
welfare loss to state residents from increased distortions of trade in imports.
Three additional remarks about this result are in order.
9First, when a state chooses its optimal tax rate, i.e., when it chooses that value of τ > 0 such that
dY/dτ = 0, it distorts the eﬃciency of resource allocation in the economy as a whole, producing a
deadweight welfare loss. This is in contrast to the situation in Case 1, where the state corporation
income tax allows a pure transfer of rents from nonresident to resident households. It is also in
contrast to Case 2a, where trade does occur but the state does not tax the apportioned proﬁts of
out-of-state ﬁrms. In the present case, there is a ﬁrst-order welfare gain for the state’s residents
from the introduction of at least a small corporation income tax, but the ﬁrst-order welfare loss
from trade distortions, starting at τ = 0, is zero. Thus, states have incentives to introduce policies
that are socially ineﬃcient.
Second, it is interesting to note that the state corporation income tax now achieves economic eﬀects
that are equivalent to those that would result from a combination of a state tax on the incomes
of non-residents plus a tariﬀ on imports from other states. As noted above, the ﬁrst of these
would likely be viewed as a violation of the Due Process clause, while the second, if implemented
directly, would certainly be considered a violation of the Commerce Clause. Thus, from an economic
viewpoint, a state corporation income tax, when combined with an apportionment formula based
on sales, may be viewed as a blend of two policies, each of which, if implemented in a “naked”
form, might be considered unconstitutional.
Third, note that taxation of the proﬁts of the out-of-state producers of intermediate inputs based
on a single-factor sales-based apportionment rule is a second-best policy from the viewpoint of a
taxing state, and from the viewpoint of the ensemble of all states. Individual states would ideally
tax only the proﬁts of foreign-owned ﬁrms operating within their boundaries and would avoid
the trade distortions arising from the taxation of the proﬁts of out-of-state ﬁrms, which could be
achieved by declaring proﬁts to be taxable only for ﬁrms operating within the state, as in Case 1.
Such an outcome does arise if liability for state corporation income taxes is based on a “physical
presence” nexus standard, and it would also be the case if states were to apportion income for tax
purposes solely on the basis of factors like payroll and capital that do not depend on sales within
the state.13
2.3 Case 3: State corporation income taxes and corporate organization
The analysis so far has highlighted some reasons why states might wish to tax the income of
corporations, but it also indicates that the use of the sales factor in the apportionment of proﬁts may
be contrary to the interest of a state’s residents. This leaves a puzzle: why are states increasingly
using apportionment formulas that not only include the sales factor, but that even attach extra
weight to it?
To see why states have incentives to do this, recall that the beneﬁt of corporation income taxes, in
13Under the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty for the taxation of the income of multinational corporations, as
well as Canada’s system of provincial taxation of multi-province corporations, a corporation’s income is taxable
in jurisdictions where it has “permanent establishments”. Application of such a standard appears to exempt a
corporation’s income from taxation in the absence of a “physical presence”.
10the models considered so far, is entirely dependent on foreign ownership of proﬁt-making ﬁrms that
operate entirely within the state – the ﬁrms in the F sector. Although these ﬁrms may possibly
sell their output outside of the state, their production processes occur entirely within the state.
The nonresident owners of these ﬁrms would desire, if possible, to avoid the tax burdens of state
corporation income taxation. To do this, suppose that a corporation is organized, or reorganized, in
such a way that ownership of the crucial assets that give rise to its proﬁts can be separated from the
ownership of the assets that are used in the ﬁrm’s operations within a given state, and suppose that
the ownership of these assets is embodied in some intangible claim. For instance, in the preceding
analysis, the ﬁrms in the F sector are assumed to derive pure proﬁts from their operations in a
state, perhaps because each has made some innovation, built a reputation, or depends upon some
entrepreneurial skill that generates a net return over and above the cost of the ﬁrm’s primary and
intermediate inputs.
Suppose that the ownership of these underlying assets can be embodied in intangible assets, such
as trademarks, patents, or copyrights, and that the ownership of these assets can be transferred to
out-of-state households or ﬁrms with no tax consequences.14 The services of these assets can be
utilized within the state by in-state ﬁrms if they pay royalties, licensing fees, or other compensation
for them. Suppose that the value of this compensation is equal to the proﬁts that would otherwise
accrue to the F-sector ﬁrms within the state. With out-of-state ownership of these intangible assets,
the state income tax can no longer capture the rents that would previously have been taxable as
the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the F sector, unless the state uses an income apportionment formula
that includes a sales factor and is empowered to tax out-of-state ﬁrms whose only contact with
the state is that they derive revenues from the use of their intangible assets by in-state ﬁrms.15
If the state implements a single-factor sales-based apportionment rule, and if out-of-state ﬁrms
that derive revenues from the sales (licensing, leasing, etc.) of intangible assets within the state
are deemed to have nexus for corporation income tax purposes, then the state income tax is still
capable of capturing rents that out-of-state residents would otherwise obtain as the return on these
intangible assets.
Under this corporation income tax structure, the net income of in-state residents is given by (13),
because the term πf now represents the return to the ownership of intangible assets utilized in the
F sector, and this return is taxable. In the special case where the state imports no intermediate
goods or services other than the right to utilize these intangible assets, the model eﬀectively reduces
to the model of Case 1, and the net income of state residents is given by (5). In this case, the
optimal state corporation income tax policy is described by Proposition 1, but its interpretation is
diﬀerent: it now describes the optimal tax policy for a state that taxes the proﬁts of out-of-state
ﬁrms that license intangible assets to in-state ﬁrms, assuming that there are no other imports to
14Alternatively, these assets “originate” outside of the state, subsequent to which the F-sector ﬁrms are established.
15It might also be possible for ﬁrms in the G sector to be structured in such a way that they pay out-of-state ﬁrms
for the use of intangible assets that, if owned by the in-state ﬁrms, would produce taxable proﬁts. From the strict
representative-agent perspective, the avoidance of state corporation income taxes in the G sector has no eﬀect on
net income, and thus the use of organizational structures that shrink the taxable proﬁts of ﬁrms that are owned by
in-state residents is inconsequential. If in-state households are heterogeneous, however, the avoidance of taxes by
in-state business owners might be problematic. To address this question requires an analysis of the basic rationale
for state-level business income taxes, which goes beyond the scope of the present study.
11the state.
In the more general case where the state does import other intermediate inputs, as of course is true
empirically for every state in the highly integrated US economy, the model corresponds instead to
that of Case 2. The state does have an incentive to impose a positive tax rate, to use a sales-based
apportionment formula, and to deem out-of-state ﬁrms to have nexus, for corporation income tax
purposes, if they derive revenue from sales to in-state ﬁrms.16 Proposition 2b and (15) describe
the optimal state tax policy. As noted in that context, the equilibrium of such a system entail
deadweight welfare losses due to the distortion of interstate trade.
The preceding remarks suggest that states can eﬀectively capture a portion of the proﬁts accruing
to nonresident owners of intangible assets if these assets are owned by out-of-state corporations,
if the licensing, rental, or sale of these assets within the state is determined to establish nexus
there, and if the state uses a formula apportionment rule that attaches positive weight to the sales
factor. It should be noted,however, that this mechanism of rent capture might be defeated by
a somewhat more complex form of industrial organization. To illustrate, let us consider a three
state example, in which a rent-generating intangible asset is created by some individual such as
an engineer, author, or artist, located in state A. This asset will ultimately be of value to ﬁrms
operating in state C. If the creator of the asset forms a corporation and licenses its intangible asset
directly to licensees in state C, that state can capture a portion of the rents that would otherwise
accrue to the creator of the asset, as just described. Suppose instead, however, that the corporation
that holds the intangible asset sells ownership of the asset to another corporation, located in state
B. This corporation in B now licenses the product to licensees in state C. In other words, a
new owner, the corporation in state B, is now interposed between the creator of the asset and the
licensee. Assuming that the asset is sold at its proper market price to the corporation in state B,
that corporation’s (economic) proﬁts will be zero: the fees it receives for the licensing of the asset
will be just suﬃcient to compensate for the asset’s purchase. In this case, state C will obtain zero
revenue from the taxation of the corporation in state B. To capture rents from the original creator
of the asset, state C would need to tax the sale of the asset by the creator of the intangible asset in
state A to the corporation in state B. This would be an unconstitutional extension of the taxing
powers of state C.
Indeed, as should now be clear, the “transactional distance” between the ultimate user of an
intangible asset, such as a ﬁnal consumer, and the original creator of the intangible asset, such as
an inventor, may be arbitrarily long, as (say) an inventor sells an idea to a corporation that produces
a product that is purchased by some other corporation that sells its products or services to some
other corporation, and so on, until ﬁnally a household consumes a product whose price reﬂects, in
part, the value of the original invention. Such a “transaction chain” (see Wildasin (2000), 438, and
(2002), 184, 187) for related discussion) may separate the original owner of a proﬁt stream from a
taxing jurisdiction by many more than just three states.
Still, even long transactions chains may not protect nonresident owners of proﬁt-producing assets
16Provided that πf > 0, the ﬁrst-order welfare gain to the state from the imposition of at least a small tax is
strictly positive.
12to escape the imposition of tax burdens by “downstream” states. In the simple three-state example
above, the ability of the original asset owner in state A to escape the burden of a tax imposed in
state C depends on the (implicit) premise that the sale of the rights to that asset to a corporation in
state B is not taxed by state B. In fact, within the conﬁnes of the model above, state B would have
an incentive to impose such a tax. If it does, then it is state B, and not the further downstream
state C, that is able to capture the rent from the creator of the asset. In fact, the formal analysis
presented above already incorporates just this case; it merely needs to be interpreted to apply at
one stage further “upstream”.
3 Conclusion
The preceding analysis has examined the distributional and eﬃciency implications of state corpo-
ration income taxation under varying assumptions about nexus standards, formula apportionment,
and business structure. It has highlighted the potential of a corporation income tax to transfer
rents to the residents of a state at the expense of nonresident owners of in-state businesses. To
the extent that businesses can be structured so that these rents accrue to nonresident owners of
intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, however, a state corporation income
tax with a nexus standard based on physical presence, or with an apportionment formula that does
not include a sales factor, cannot capture these rents. If sales within a state suﬃces to establish
nexus, and if income is apportioned with sales as one or perhaps the only apportionment factor,
a portion of these rents can once again be captured through the state corporation income tax.
Implemented in this way, however, the corporation income tax imposes an implicit tariﬀ of imports
from other states, distorting interstate trade and generating deadweight eﬃciency losses.
In principle, the normative evaluation of tax policy should be concerned not only with matters
of allocative eﬃciency but with distributional issues as well. The distributional eﬀects of state
corporation income taxes are not easily ascertained, however. Within the models presented above,
such taxes redistribute rents among households in diﬀerent states in accordance with the degree of
cross-ownership of claims on proﬁt-making assets. From a distributional perspective, they would
thus seem, on balance, to transfer resources away from states where households own a large fraction
of the nation’s wealth.17 The empirical diﬃculties involved in determining the net degree of cross-
ownership of proﬁt-producing assets among households residing in diﬀerent states are formidable,
and there seems to be little evidence on the basis of which one could even hazard an informed conjec-
ture about the net interstate transfers produced by state corporation income taxes.18 Furthermore,
17Departing from the “representative agent” framework, and recognizing that wealth is unequally distributed among
households, state taxes on business proﬁts would transfer resources from wealthy to less-wealthy households. For
the issues at stake in the present context, however, the intrastate distribution of income is of secondary importance;
diﬀerent nexus standards “matter” insofar as they aﬀect the distribution of tax burdens among households in diﬀerent
states.
18In a general-equilibrium setting, of course, the policies undertaken in one state aﬀect the entire constellation of
equilibrium prices for all goods and factors throughout the entire economy (Bradford 1978). A computable general-
equilibrium analysis could conceivably be used to evaluate the implications of changes in nexus standards for business
proﬁts taxes, either for a single state or for all states taken together, provided that data could be found that would
13from an overall social perspective, the degree to which state policies ought to be evaluated in terms
of their distributional impacts is somewhat debatable; according to one inﬂuential perspective on
ﬁscal federalism, the tasks of the “distributional branch”of the public sector should in any case
be assigned” to the national government, with subnational governments focusing primarily or even
exclusively on promoting allocative eﬃciency (see, e.g., Oates (1972), for discussion and references).
In sum, it is diﬃcult to see a substantial basis, on distributional equity grounds, in favor of any
particular nexus standard for state corporation income taxes.
It goes without saying that the foregoing analysis has neglected many potentially important di-
mensions of state corporation income taxes. In some respects, the analysis bears a resemblance
to that presented in Wildasin and Wilson (1998), in which cross-ownership of resources produces
incentives for decentralized governments to engage in conﬁscatory taxation, thereby removing the
potential eﬃciency gains from the pooling of independent risks arising in diﬀerent jurisdictions; the
preceding analysis has abstracted from any such risk-pooling considerations. The analysis has also
ignored the possibility that the economic activities of corporations, whether or not they beneﬁt
from public goods and services provided by states, may impose costs on states through congestion
eﬀects. In general, such congestion eﬀects provide a rationale for taxes or non-tax charges on busi-
ness activities on ﬁrms that are physically present within a jurisdiction, but out-of-state vendors
of intangibles do not produce such congestion eﬀects and would not be taxed on such grounds.
The suitability of corporation income taxes are an instrument for internalizing congestion costs is
questionable, in any case, since such eﬀects may well be produced both by ﬁrms that make proﬁts
and by those that do not.
Still other complications may arise from the mismeasurement of corporate proﬁts for tax purposes,
such that state corporation income taxes distort ﬁrm ﬁnancial structures, investment and em-
ployment decisions, organizational forms, and other types of economic behavior. In addition, the
foregoing analysis has assumed that ﬁrms in the economy are perfectly competitive and exercise no
appreciable market power. Clearly, the welfare implications of alternative tax policies may be quite
diﬀerent in an economy with monopolistic, oligopolistic, or monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Fi-
nally, as noted earlier, taxation of economic rents creates incentives for lobbying activities which
may give rise to deadweight welfare losses insofar as these are inherently costly or to the extent
that they distort policies in ways that introduce additional distortions. Further analysis of these
issues, some of which have already been examined in previous research, goes beyond the scope of
the present paper.
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